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WHEN IS ENOUGH ENOUGH?
REDUCTION TO PRACTICE AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DURING PATENT PRIORITY DISPUTES
R. Douglas Bradley, Ph.D.
Abstract. This Note examines the current U.S. Patent and Trademark Office standards for
determining patent priority in an interference proceeding. In particular, this Note reviews and
criticizes the procedural rules governing the implementation of summary judgment in an
interference. In Schendel v. Curtis, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had the
opportunity to articulate a clear analytical framework to guide Administrative Patent Judges in
the determination of what experimental evidence, and how much of it, a party must present to
establish a prima facie showing of reduction to practice. This Note argues that, in an
interference proceeding, once a party has argued with particularity that certain evidence is
sufficient to establish reduction to practice of the invention in dispute, then the Administrative
Patent Judge should explicitly state for the record why that evidence is insufficient. In
addition, Administrative Patent Judges should conform to the same summary judgment
standards that federal judges use in deciding whether to impose summary judgment against a
non-moving party: all inferences drawn from underlying facts should be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is being applied.
As the only major industrial country in the world that operates with a
first-to-invent patent priority rule,' the United States is under increasing
pressure to harmonize its patent practices with the rest of the
industrialized world.2 This has caused much discussion of the pros and
cons of converting the U.S. patent priority system from a first-to-invent
rule to one in which priority is determined solely by which inventor is
the first to file a patent application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO). Implicit in the structure of a first-to-invent patent system
is the need for a procedural mechanism to resolve the inevitable priority
disputes that arise when more than one inventor lays claim to the same
invention. The U.S. patent statutes allow for such disputes and authorize
1. Kim Taylor, Patent Harmonization Treaty Negotiations on Hold: The "First to File" Debate
Continues, 20 J. Contemp. L. 521, 521 (1994). In patent law the term "priority" means the party who
has proved first invention. In a first-to-file patent system, the party who is first to apply for a patent
establishes priority for the described invention. In contrast, under the U.S. first-to-invent patent
priority system, the party who can establish that it was the first to invent a claimed invention has
patent priority. Robert P. Merges, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials 32 (1992).
2. See generally Matthew P. Donohue, First-to-File vs. First-to-Invent: Will the Universities Be
Left Behind?, 21 J.C. & U.L. 765 (1995); Robert W. Pritchard, The Future Is Now-The Case for
Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 291 (1995); Taylor, supra note 1; Harold C.




interference proceedings to determine patent priority.' However, a recent
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals4 case, Schendel v. Curtis,s directly
implicates the issue of whether PTO interference proceedings using
summary judgment have adequate procedural safeguards to ensure that
priority disputes in highly technical arts, such as biotcchnology, are
resolved fairly.
One argument frequently offered in favor of the first-to-invent priority
rule is that it is inherently fairer than a first-to-file rule. In theory, a first-
to-invent priority system awards patents based upon the actual time that
an invention is made, thus allowing an individual inventor who might not
have the time or financial resources to file a patent application
immediately a period of time in which he or she may still file and defeat
the claim of a later inventor who has beaten the first inventor to the
patent office.6 However, this contention is predicated upon the notion
that the PTO rules and procedures for resolving interferences are
themselves fair and efficient. Thus, one of the primary responsibilities of
the Administrative Patent Judge (APJ)7 who adjudicates an interference
proceeding is to determine the date on which an invention was first
conceived and reduced to practice!
Given that many inventions occur in highly sophisticated scientific
and technical fields, it is important to ensure that the APJ has fairly and
completely evaluated all submitted evidence pertaining to the moment of
3. A patent interference is the adjudicative proceeding administered by the PTO to determine
inventorship priority. It may be instigated by either the PTO or by inventors who have independently
submitted patent applications for the same invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1994) ("The Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences shall determine questions of priority of the inventions.. . "); U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, Manual ofPatent Etamining Procedure § 2300.01, at 2300-1 to 2300-4
(6th ed. rev.1 1995) [hereinafter MPEP]; see also inffra notes 57-83 and accompanying text.
4. Appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving claims under patent statutes and PTO rules and
regulations resides exclusively with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit The Federal Circuit
was created in 1982 by joining the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and tha Court of Claims to
provide more consistent appellate review of cases involving interpretation of patent law. Donald S.
Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property Law § 2B[6], at 2-17 to 2-18
(1992).
5. 83 F.3d 1399 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
6. See Donohue, supra note 2, at 772-75.
7. See 37 C.F.1L § 1.610 (1996).
8. Conception and reduction to practice are patent terms of art used to determine the time at which
an inventor first makes an invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994). Conception embodies the
mental aspect of inventorship or the solving of a problem by the creation of a tangible means of
solving or carrying out the idea. Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929). Reduction
to practice occurs when an inventor builds an embodiment of the invention and tests it to determine
that it will be operable in its intended functional setting. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See infra Part I.B.
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invention. In Schendel, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences' (Board) decision that an APJ had properly
used summary judgment to find that Schendel had failed, as a matter of
law, to provide sufficient experimental evidence to establish a prima
facie case of reduction to practice9 of a biotechnological invention.0
However, given the technical evidence offered by Schendel in support of
reduction to practice," the Federal Circuit decision is hard to reconcile
with either the summary judgment standard used in federal courts 2 or the
record formation requirements implicit in the statutory authorization of
appellate review by the Federal Circuit. 3
The Schendel decision highlights one of the main faults with the
current reduction to practice standards-the lack of clarity concerning
how much and what kind of evidence a junior party must present to
establish a prima facie case of reduction to practice. Because of the
difficulty in determining when reduction to practice of an invention has
occurred, it is critical that APJs be required to examine fully all of the
evidence put forward by junior parties in support of priority and to
develop a full record of their factual findings concerning the submitted
evidence. This is particularly true when an APJ intends to dispose of an
interference by summary judgment. The Schendel decision raises serious
questions of whether the PTO's interference summary judgment standard
fairly protects a junior party's interest in obtaining a full evidentiary
hearing of his or her priority assertion. This in turn suggests that the U.S.
first-to-invent system might not offer as much fairness to inventors as its
proponents suggest it does.
9. In a patent interference dispute, the junior party has the initial burden of providing the PTO
judge with:
(1) evidence which may consist of patents or printed publications, other documents, and one or
more affidavits which demonstrate that [the] applicant is prima facie entitled to a judgment
relative to the patentee and (2) an explanation stating with particularity the basis upon which the
applicant is prima facie entitled to the judgment.
37 C.F.R § 1.608(b) (1996).
10. Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1404.
11. See injfra notes 94-98, 132-46 and accompanying text.
12. While the summary judgment standard used in patent interference is similar to that used in
federal courts, the standard is significantly different in one respect: there is no requirement that
inferences be drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is being applied. See
infra notes 80-83, 153-86 and accompanying text.
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1994) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent and Trademark




This Note argues, first, that APJs, in deciding interference disputes by
summary judgment, should be required to specifically state for the record
any defects in the experimental evidence submitted by a junior party.
Second, APJs also should be required to adhere to the same summary
judgment standards utilized in federal courts: "the evidence of the non-
movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor."' 4 Part I reviews the statutory requirements of t:he U.S. patent
system, the process of determining patent priority through interference
proceedings, and the burden of proof that must be met to establish
reduction to practice. Part II provides an overview of tae Schendel v.
Curtis priority dispute. Part III analyzes the Federal Circuit's reasoning
in Schendel and discusses why adopting the federal court summary
judgment standard would more fairly promote and protect the first-to-
invent priority rule.
I. THE FIRST-TO-INVENT PATENT SYSTEM AND THE
DETERMINATION OF PATENT PRIORITY
The PTO serves as the public's representative to insure that parties
seeking to obtain patents meet all of the statutory requirements
delineated by Congress. 5 From the outset, the United States has awarded
patents to inventors if they could establish that they were the first to
discover a new and useful invention. 6 The determination of inventorship
priority is facilitated by the explicit statutory declaration of the criteria
by which the date of invention is to be determined. 7 However, problems
easily arise in the application of such criteria when judges are placed in
the position of reviewing highly technical documents peraining to what
is necessarily a hindsight determination of the moment of invention.
Thus, there is a clear need for procedural guidelines to safeguard the
rights of parties involved in patent priority disputes.
14. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970).
15. See generally Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
16. See generally Pritchard, supra note 2, at 292-99 (providing short history of U.S. patent
statutes and first-to-invent requirements). Pritchard notes that the very first patent statutes, enacted in
1790, authorized the PTO to grant patents only to the first true inventor of a particular invention. Id.
at 294.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). Section 102(g) requires the PTO to consider dates of conception and
reduction to practice of an invention and, under some circumstances, the reasonable diligence of an
inventor in pursuing his or her inventive activities to completion by filing a patent application. See
infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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A. U.S. Patent Statutes
The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to enact patent statutes.1 8
The fundamental purpose of the U.S. patent system is to promote
scientific and technological innovations by allowing limited monopolies
on the use of an invention in exchange for early and complete disclosure
to the public. 9 In essence, patents are issued as the result of the
formation of a "public policy" contract between the patentee and the
general public.2"
Currently, four key statutes detail the patentability requirements that
an inventor must meet when preparing and submitting a patent
application to the PTO.2" First, an inventor is entitled to a patent only if
the claimed invention pertains to certain subject matters and is useful.'
Second, an application must be submitted within the statutorily specified
time,' and the claimed invention must be novel.24 Third, patents are only
18. See U.S. Const art. I, § 8, cls. 8, 18. The Constitution provides:
The Congress shall have Power... (8] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries;... [and] [18J To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ....
Id.
19. See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-51 (1989)
(reviewing history of U.S. patent statutes and role of public policy).
20. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51 ("The federal patent system ... embodies a carefully
crafted bargain .... In consideration of [an invention's] disclosure and the consequent benefit to the
community, the patent is granted.").
21. After submission of a patent application, it is assigned to a patent examiner who has some
expertise in the technical field of the invention described by the applicant. The examiner then
searches for prior patents and other publications ("prior art") in the field of the invention and
determines if the invention as claimed meets the other statutory requirements for patentability.
22. Section 101 of the patent statutes provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
23. Section 102(b) sets forth statutory bars to patentability that are specific to the behavior of the
inventor with regard to use or public disclosure of the invention more than one year prior to the
patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). As explained by Professor Merges, "[Section] 102(a)
events bar the patent because the inventor was notfirst, and § 102(b) events bar a patent because the
inventor did not applyfor apatent soon enough." Merges, supra note 2, at 163.
24. While § 101 provides that an invention must be new in order to be patentable, it is § 102(a)
that explicitly requires an invention to be novel at the time of invention. That is, the invention must
not have been "known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent."
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). This is a major distinction from a first-to-file patent system, which
determines novelty based upon what is known at the time a patent application is filed. Thus, the
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awarded for inventions that are considered to be nonobvious to other
persons having ordinary skill in the technical field pertaining to the
invention.' Lastly, a submitted patent application must contain written
information and drawings describing the invention, how it was made, and
the best mode known to the inventor for practicing the invention,
sufficient to enable a person skilled within the field to make and use the
26invention.
Even if a patent application meets all of the patentability require-
ments, an applicant may still lose the right to a patent if other inventors
are able to prove that they made the invention first.27 Section 102(g) of
the patent statutes mandates that a patent is only awarded to the inventor
who is the first to invent, rather than first to submit a patent application
to the PTO.28 Thus, in addition to requiring that patents be awarded based
upon who is the first to invent, section 102(g) also specifies the criteria to
be considered by the PTO in determining patent priority: the dates of
conception and reduction to practice.
first-to-file priority rule provides a strong incentive to an inventor to file a patent application as early
as possible.
The body of worldwide knowledge in any technical field, whether it exists in patents, publications,
products on sale to the public, or methods in common usage, comprises what is termed "prior art."
Sections 102(a), (b), (e), and (g) specify what prior art is for purposes of determining novelty. See
Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 4, § 2C[5][a], at 2-83 to 2-85.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). What is nonobvious to a person skilled in the ext is also determined
by reference to the prior art and whether a skilled person, upon consideration of the prior art, would
view the invention as obvious. Prior art for the purposes of determining obviousness is not explicitly
defined in § 103, but generally it includes all of the prior art used for the determination of invention
novelty. See generally Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 4, § 2C[5][a], at 2-83 to 2-85 (discussing
determination of prior art in context of§§ 101, 103).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112(1994).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994). Specifically, § 102(g) states:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless... before the applicant's invention thereof the
invention was made in this country by another who had not abandon d, suppressed, or
concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the
respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable
diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, frim a time prior to
conception by the other.
35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
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B. Conception, Diligence, and Reduction to Practice
Normally, the date of invention is considered to be the date on which
the PTO receives a patent application.29 If the PTO determines that
substantially the same invention is claimed by multiple inventors, the
focus shifts from the date of filing to the date of invention. The PTO may
then declare an interference to resolve the issue of which inventor made
the invention first.
Once the PTO has declared an interference, the PTO must decide
which inventor has priority to the invention described by the interference
count.3" An interference "count" is the term used by the PTO to describe
the inventive subject matter for which the priority is in dispute. The
junior party to an interference has the burden of establishing that it was
in possession of the invention before the senior party.3 In an interference
proceeding, the party who has the earliest effective patent filing date is
called the "senior party." Any other party involved with an interference
has a later patent filing date and is referred to as a "junior party."'32 For
purposes of an interference, an invention is in the possession of an
inventor when the inventor has both conceived and reduced to practice
the disputed invention.3 Thus, the junior party must establish dates of
actual conception and reduction to practice that are earlier than the senior
party's constructive date of invention (the date upon which the senior
party filed a patent application).3 4
An invention is conceived when its inventor formulates a definite and
permanent idea of all of the features and limitations recited in a patent
application's claims.35 Although conception of an invention is subjective,
29. An inventor may also claim U.S. patent priority based upon the date of filing of a patent
application in a foreign country. 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1994). However, a foreign inventor must file for
the corresponding patent in the United States within one year of the foreign filing. An applicant
claiming benefit of a foreign application has the burden of proving entitlement to the benefit of the
earlier-filed foreign application by demonstrating that the foreign patent specification meets the three
requirements contained in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164,
1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
30. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 4, § 2D[5][h][i], at 2-94.
31. Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that junior party is required
to establish reduction to practice or conception before filing date of senior party, and that in event of
tie, priority must be awarded to senior party).
32 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(m) (1996).
33. Rex-Chaimbelt, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 477 F.2d 481,487 (7th Cir. 1973).
34. 35 U.S.C § 135 (1994).
35. This standard of conception was first articulated in Mergenthaler v. Scudder, I1 App. D.C.
264 (D.C. Cir. 1897), and adopted by the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Gunter v.
Stream, 573 F.2d 77 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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courts have added an objective component by requiring that an inventor
show independent corroborating evidence of conception.36 If an inventor
can further establish diligent behavior in developing an invention, from
the time of conception through reduction to practice an5 the filing of a
patent application, then the inventor will be entitled to the date of
conception as the earliest possible patent priority date.37
Due diligence in the pursuit of patent protection is required after
conception to encourage inventors to promptly put their inventions into a
workable form and disclose them to the public in the form of an
application." Failure to show reasonable diligence in reducing an
invention to practice will preclude inventors from later asserting priority
based upon the date of conception. Tardy inventors may, however, still
establish a priority date based upon the date they actually began to
diligently reduce the invention to practice.39 Diligent activity is any
inventor behavior that is directed towards reduction to practice.40
There are two kinds of reduction to practice: construclive and actual.4'
Constructive reduction to practice is accomplished by filing a patent
application containing a full disclosure of the invention. 2 The invention
The conception of an invention consists in the complete performance of the mental part of the
inventive act. All that remains to be accomplished in order to perfect the act or instruments
belongs to the department of construction, not invention. It is therefore the formation in the
mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as
it is thereafter to be applied in practice that constitutes an available coiception within the
meaning of the patent law.
Id at 80 (quoting Mergenthaler, 11 App. D.C. at 276); see also Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353,
359 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Heard v. Burton, 333 F.2d 239, 243 (C.C.P.A. 1964). See generally Chisum &
Jacobs, supra note 4, § 2D[5][c], at 2-186 to 2-187 (discussing law of conception).
36. An inventor must have disclosed, to at least one non-inventor, sufficient information about the
invention to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to build and use the invention without
extensive research or experimentation. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223,
1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 771 (1996); see also Coleman, 754 F.2d at 359;
Field v. Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
37. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 4, § 2D[5][e], at 2-189 to 2-191.
38. Id.
39. Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
40. Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 626-28 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing examples of
reasonable diligence); In re Nelson, 420 F.2d 1079, 1081 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that although
inventor need not demonstrate constant effort, two-month delay must b explained); Hull v.
Davenport, 90 F.2d 103, 105 (C.C.P.A. 1937) (holding that reasonable diligence may be shown by
afffirative acts, acceptable excuses, or reasons for failure to act).
41. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 4, § 2D[5][d], at 2-88.
42. A valid disclosure must meet the requirements delineated in 35 U.S.C. § 112; that is, it must
provide sufficient information about the invention to "enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same." 35 U.S.C. § 112
1116
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description and examples contained within the application are considered
sufficient to establish the priority date as the date on which the patent
application was filed.43 Actual reduction to practice is achieved when an
inventor builds a version of the invention and performs tests to determine
whether it operates within the functional environment as planned.'
Inventors need not show that the invention is ready for commercial
development; they just must show that their inventive concept will
probably work.45 Determination of whether actual reduction to practice
has occurred is a question of law.46 On appeal, courts review
determinations of actual reduction to practice de novo47 and review the
PTO's underlying factual findings for clear error.48
Historically, biotechnology and biological sciences are classified as
"unpredictable" arts from a patenting point of view.49 One important
ramification of an art being deemed unpredictable is that inventors may
only submit evidence of reduction to practice to establish a priority date
for interference purposes. Evidence relating to the time of conception
(1994). See also Travis v. Baker, 137 F.2d 109, 111 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (holding that to comply with
doctrine of constructive reduction to practice, specification must be for same invention and contain
disclosure of invention that is sufficient to enable one skilled in art to practice invention).
43. A senior party who submits no other evidence of invention priority is confined to his or her
filing date for conception of the invention and its constructive reduction to practice. See Weil v.
Fritz, 572 F.2d 856, 865 n.16 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Travis, 137 F.2d at 110.
44. Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that actual reduction to
practice requires more than theoretical capability; it requires that apparatus exist and work for its
intended purpose); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1445 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("[R]eduction to practice requires that an invention be sufficiently tested to demonstrate that it
will work for its intended purpose.").
45. Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Reduction to practice does not require
'that the invention, when tested, be in a commercially satisfactory stage of development.") (citations
omitted).
46. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding
that reduction to practice and conception are legal determinations).
47. Id.
48. Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353,356 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
49. See generally Jackie Hutter, Note, A Definite and Permanent Idea? Invention in the
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Sciences and the Determination of Conception in Patent Law, 28
J. Marshall L. Rev. 687 (1995). See also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200,
1206-07 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Based on the uncertainties of the method and lack of information con-
cerning the amino acid sequence of the EPO protein... neither party had an adequate conception of
the DNA sequence until reduction to practice had been achieved...."); Rey-Bellet v. Engelhardt,
493 F.2d 1380, 1387 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (explaining that unpredictable response human subject might
exhibit dictates that considerable preliminary testing in animals be done); Smith v. Bousquet, 111
F.2d 157, 159-63 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (agreeing with PTO's determination that in experimental sciences
of chemistry and biology, conception of invention is unpredictable and cannot occur until
experimental results are obtained that reduce invention to practice).
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will not be considered because, in unpredictable fields, conception of an
inventive idea is too speculative to deserve the awarding of patent
priority.5" Thus, the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice5 requires inventors to establish that their inventions actually
work as originally conceived before priority may be established. One of
the policy considerations motivating the doctrine cf simultaneous
conception and reduction to practice is the prevention of patent priority
being determined by claims of conception that are nothing more than "a
general goal or research plan."52 Therefore, in highly unpredictable arts,
inventions are simultaneously conceived and reduced to practice when
inventors successfully perform the necessary experiments to prove
feasibility.53
Recently, the Federal Circuit explicitly declined to apply the doctrine
of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice to all experimental
arts. In Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the court
refused to invoke the doctrine to decide an appeal from a patent
infringement judgment concerning the HIV drug AZT.54 The court stated
that 'conception may fail to establish the moment of invention, not
because a particular field is inherently unpredictable, but because in such
fields conception is usually incomplete absent reduction to practice. 5 In
recent years the Federal Circuit has only invoked the doctrine of
simultaneous conception and reduction to practice to resolve priority
disputes centered upon biotechnology gene sequence inventions.5 6
50. See generally Hlutter, supra note 49; Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 4, § 2D[5][c], at 2-187 to
2-189.
51. See Hutter, supra note 49, at 698-712 (reviewing history of doct-ne of simultaneous
conception and reduction to practice).
52. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("An idea is
definite and permanent when the inventor has a specific, settled idea, a particular solution to the
problem at hand, not just a general goal or research plan he hopes to pursue."), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 771 (1996); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that policy behind
patent statutes is to promote public disclosure of inventions, not research plans).
53. In Bousquet, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explicitly adopted the doctrine of
simultaneous conception and reduction to practice. See Bousquet, 111 F.2d at 159-64.
54. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d 1223; see also Hutter, supra note 49, at 713-22.
55. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1229.
56. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that when
inventor is unable to envision gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as well as method for
obtaining it, conception has not been achieved until reduction to practice has occurred, i.e., until
after gene has been isolated).
1118
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C. Resolution ofPriority Through Interference Proceedings
An interference is an adjudicative proceeding administered by the
Board under a complex set of regulations." During an interference, an
APJ must determine which inventor has the earliest documented date of
invention. 8 The preparation and filing of initial motions and preliminary
statements are very important in setting forth the evidence that will
determine the outcome of the interference. 9 Prior to reaching an
interference "trial" with its attendant discovery provisions,' however,
junior parties must make an evidentiary showing that they are "prima
facie entitled to a judgment. 61
1. Declaration ofInterference
If a PTO examiner, while examining a pending application for patent-
ability,62 discovers that another patent application or unexpired patent
contains claims corresponding to the same invention described in the
application under review, the examiner is authorized to declare an inter-
ference.63 While the primary purpose of an interference is to determine
invention priority, the APJ is also authorized to resolve patentability
questions.' If applicants discover on their own that a recently issued
patent claims the same invention described in their patent application,65
they may also provoke an interference by incorporating into their
57. Conservolite, Inc. v. Widmayer, 21 F.3d 1098, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Interference practice is
highly arcane and specialized, and complicating the situation is the fact that the PTO changed its
rules fairly recently."). See generally Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 4, § 2D[5], at 2-194 to 2-201
(explaining interference procedure).
58. 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(i) (1996).
59. See generally Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 4, § 2D[5][h], at 2-194 to 2-201.
60. Unlike a regular civil trial, the discovery process in a patent interference is limited, although
the APJ has the discretion to order additional discovery. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.687 (1996).
61. 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b) (1996); see also infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
63. Specifically, the PTO examiner, in comparing two sets of claims to substantially the same
invention, defines one or more "counts" that specifically delineate the interfering subject matter.
37 C.F.R. § 1.601(f) (1996); see also In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The
count of an interference is merely the vehicle for contesting the priority of invention and determining
what evidence is relevant to the issue of priority.").
64. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1994); 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(i) (1996); MPEP, supra note 3, § 2300.01, at
2300-1 to 2300-4. For example, the PTO rules allow an interference party to file motions contesting
the patentablity of an opponent's claim. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.633(a) (1996).
65. If the interference is with an unexpired patent, the patent must not have issued more than one
year before the filing of the interfering patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 135(b).
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application a claim to subject matter that is substantially the same as that
claimed in a previously-issued patent.5
In determining patent priority, APJs are under a statutory mandate to
consider "not only the respective dates of conception aad reduction to
practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who
was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to
conception by the other."'67 Thus, key to the resolution of invention
priority is the determination of which party first conceived and reduced
to practice the invention. In unpredictable arts, such as biotechnology,
the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction ti practice is in
force, and the inquiry is focused solely on the date of constructive or
actual reduction to practice.68
2. Establishment ofPriority Based Upon Actual Reducdon to Practice
To establish actual reduction to practice of an invention, the junior
party has the burden of proving that the embodiment relied upon as
evidence of reduction to practice actually worked for its intended
purpose.69 An embodiment is any physical manifestation that falls within
the inventive concept or principle as described by the patent claim. 70
Thus, to show reduction to practice, inventors need only demonstrate that
they have created one embodiment. However, that embodiment must be
shown to have incorporated every limitation of the interference count.7'
These requirements are consistent with the policy of not rewarding patent
protection to inventors who have not met all of the patentability
statutes.72 To award patent priority based upon the reduclion of practice
of an embodiment that is itself outside of the described invention would
be unfair to the senior party and a fraud upon the public.
The applicable standard of proof to be used by the PTO in assessing
whether a party has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate actual
66. 35 U.S.C. § 135(b).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994); see also supra note 27.
68. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
69. Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 588 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (explaining that "invention is not
reduced to practice until its practicability or utility is demonstrated pursuant to its intended
purpose").
70. See Merges, supra note 1, at 11.
71. Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1581,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[E]very limitation of the interference count must exist in the embodiment
and be shown to have performed as intended.").
72. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
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reduction to practice depends upon the facts giving rise to the
interference. When an interference is between a senior party's patent that
has issued from an application that was originally pending at the same
time as the junior party's application, then the applicable standard of
proof for conception, diligence, and reduction to practice is
preponderance of the evidence.73 This standard requires the fact finder
"to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its
nonexistence before [he or she] may find in favor of the party who has
the burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact's existence."74 In contrast,
when an interference is declared based upon an application that was filed
to provoke an interference with a patent that has already issued, then the
junior party is required to prove his or her invention date based upon
clear and convincing evidence.75 This heightened standard of proof is
premised on society's interest in protecting patents that have already
issued.76
Even after inventors have presented sufficient evidence based upon
their own testimony to establish reduction to practice, they are also
required to provide independent corroborating evidence.77 Evidence of
corroboration may consist of witness testimony (other than that of the
inventor) or any other evidence of the facts and circumstances
concerning the reduction to practice, which is independent of the
information received from the inventor.78 The primary purpose of
corroboration is to prevent fraud.79
3. Interference Summary Judgment
The failure of junior party inventors to provide sufficient evidence to
the PTO to support their prima facie case of reduction to practice may
result in the APJ declaring summary judgment for the senior party,
73. Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 541-42 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
74. Id at542 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))
(alterations in original).
75. Id at 541; Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
76. This societal interest is "derived from the statutory presumption that an issued patent is valid."
Price, 988 F.2d at 1193. See generally Warren M. Haines II, Recent Decisions, 32 Duq. L. Rev 149
(1993) (reporting and explaining Price and its effect on interference practice).
77. Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Lacotte v. Thomas, 758 F.2d 611, 613
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b)
(1996).
78. Reese v. Hurst, 661 F.2d 1222, 1225 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
79. Berry v. Webb, 412 F.2d 261, 267 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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thereby terminating the interference process at an early stage.8" If, in the
opinion of the APJ, the evidence submitted by a junior party in support
of an actual reduction to practice8 fails to show that the junior party is
prima facie entitled to a judgment relative to the senior party, the APJ
shall, concurrent with declaring an interference, enter an order stating the
reasons for the opinion and directing the junior party to show cause why
summary judgment should not be entered against the junior party.82 PTO
rules further state that the APJ or the Board "shall decide whether the
evidence submitted... shows that the [junior party] is prima facie
entitled to a judgment relative to the [senior party]."83 However, the PTO
rules do not further state what evidentiary standards APJs are to apply in
considering junior parties' submitted evidence of reduction to practice.
II. OVERVIEW OF SCHENDEL V CURTIS
In Schendel v. Curtis, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a
summary judgment entered by the Board for the senior party, Curtis."4
Schendel claimed in his appeal, inter alia, that the Board had applied the
wrong standard of proof for the evidentiary showing required to establish
a prima facie case of reduction to practice of a fusion protein invention.85
A. Facts
The senior party, Curtis, is the holder of U.S. Patent 5,073,627, which
issued on December 17, 1991, with an accorded priority date of
August 22, 1989.86 The junior party, Schendel, submitted a patent
application that was given a priority date of August 29, 1990.87 The PTO
declared an interference based upon substantially similar claims within
the Curtis patent and the Schendel patent application. The only count in
the interference read:
80. 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(a) (1996).
81. 37 C.F.1. § 1.608(b); see also supra note 9.
82. 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(a). If the APJ determines that the junior party is prima facie entitled to a
judgment relative to the senior party, then the interference proceeds in the norml manner under PTO
regulations. See 37 C.F.RI § 1.617(a).
83. 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(g) (1996).
84. Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
85. Id at 1402; Brief for Appellant Paul Schendel at 14-15, Schendel (No. 95-1329) [hereinafter
Brief for Appellant).
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1. A fusion protein of the formula IL-3/X or X/IL-3 substantially
free from association with other proteinaceous materials, wherein X
is a hematopoietin selected from the group consisting of G-CSF and
GM-CSF, and wherein IL-3 and X are linked either directly or
through a peptide linker.88
IL-3, G-CSF, and GM-CSF are the names given to natural lymphokine
proteins found in humans.89 Purified forms of these proteins
independently stimulate the immune system in ways that were thought to
have therapeutic value in the treatment of a variety of immune
disorders.' The interference count describes fusion proteins that are
created when two different lymphokine proteins are joined together to
form a single fusion protein.
The fusion proteins at issue in Schendel were produced by both parties
through the manipulation of previously cloned and sequenced human
genes that encode the lymphokine proteins. Using recombinant DNA
methods,9' the DNA encoding two of the proteins were fused together to
form a single fusion gene that directs the synthesis of a fusion protein
that has the biological activity of both of the independent lymphokines.92
The inventive hope for the creation of such fusion proteins was that the
new bi-functional lymphokines would have greater efficacy as
therapeutic agents in the treatment of immune disorders than that
observed when each constituent protein is provided alone, or, when the
two separate proteins are administered simultaneously. 93
In compliance with interference requirements,94 Schendel submitted
an inventor declaration, five corroborating declarations, supporting
laboratory notebook entries, and an explanation stating the basis upon
which he believed that he was entitled to judgment because his evidence
88. IL at 1402 n.5.
89. Lymphokines act as molecular signals between the many types of cells involved in mounting a
human immune response.
90. Curtis et al., U.S. Patent 5,073,627, at 1 (Dec. 17, 1991).
91. See generally Benjamin Lewin, GenestV 633-56 (1994). Chapter 23 of Genes V, entitled
"The Extraordinary Power of DNA Technology," provides a good introduction to recombinant DNA
methods. Id Several Federal Circuit biotechnology patent decisions are also often cited for their
review of the basic principles of molecular biology and recombinant DNA technology. See In re
Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1554-57 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200,
1208 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894,895-99 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
92. Curtis et al., U.S. Patent 5,073,627, at 6; Joint App. (Specification and Claims of Schendel
Application, Serial No. 08/057,198) at A141, Schendel (No. 95-1329).
93. Joint App. (Specification and Claims of Schendel Application, Serial No. 08/057,198) at
A139-40.
94. 37 C.FR. § 1.608(b) (1996).
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demonstrated reduction to practice prior to Curtis's effective date.95 In
essence, Schendel's evidence of reduction to practice relied upon
documentation that he had constructed an IL-3/GSF fusion gene of a
known DNA sequence,96 expressed this fusion gene in bacteria,' and
then demonstrated that protein extracts from these bacteria contained
biological activity that was only consistent with the presence of both
protein activities on one protein molecule."
On the basis of Schendel's evidence, an APJ declared an interference
but also issued an order for Schendel to show cause why summary
judgment should not be entered against him. 9 The APJ cited two
deficiencies with Schendel's submissions to the PTO: first, there was
insufficient corroboration of Schendel's alleged reduction to practice;
and second, Schendel's evidence of reduction to practice failed to prove
that he was in possession of the invention as it was described in the
interference count. 100
PTO rules declare that summary judgment may only be entered by the
Board. 1 A Board, composed of the original APJ and two other APJ's,
reviewed the case and entered summary judgment against Schendel. 12
The Board, citing the APJ's original findings extensively, stated that
Schendel had not provided sufficient proof that he had accomplished an
actual reduction to practice of the invention that met all the limitations of
the count. The Board specifically noted Schendel's failure to provide
direct experimental evidence that the IL-3 and G-CSF constituents of the
fusion protein were "linked either directly or through a peptide linker." 3
Quoting the original show cause order, the Board supported its
conclusion by noting that a protein assay cannot be used to "provide
95. Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Joint App. (Order to Show Cause) at
A23.
96. The IL-3 and G-CSF genes were well characterized in that they had both previously been
isolated from human chromosomal DNA, and their entire DNA nucleotide sequences had been
determined and disclosed to the public. Knowing the DNA sequence allows one to use the genetic
code to translate the DNA sequence into a predicted protein sequence for the two proteins. Brief for
Appellant at 9, Schendel (No. 95-1329).
97. Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1401.
98. Id. at 1409 (Newman, J., dissenting); Brief for Appellant at 39-40.
99. Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1401.
100. Id. at 1401-02.
101. 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(g) (1996) ("If the applicant is not prima facie entitled to a judgment
relative to the patentee, the Board shall enter a final decision granting summary judgment against the
applicant.").
102. Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1402.
103. Joint App. (Final Decision) at Al1, Schendel (No. 95-1329).
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sufficient chemical structure or other sufficient characteristics such that
one of ordinary skill in the art could distinguish the protein from other
materials and ascertain the protein's structure."'" One member of the
Board dissented, arguing that the majority had applied too high a burden
of proof. °"
B. The Federal Circuit's Decision and Reasoning
In a split decision, the Federal Circuit upheld the Board's summary
judgment that Schendel had not presented sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case of actual reduction to practice." 6 The majority
decision only peripherally discussed the Board's conclusion that
Schendel had also failed to provide proof of corroboration of his alleged
reduction to practice.' 7 However, the court declined to reach this part of
Schendel's appeal, instead agreeing with the Board that Schendel had
never established a prima facie showing of actual reduction to practice.' 8
Without noting what standard of proof was required, the Federal
Circuit stated that Schendel had the burden to prove that he had prepared
a fusion protein meeting every limitation of the count.'0 9 The court
further noted that "every limitation of the interference count must exist in
the embodiment and be shown to have performed as intended.""0°
Furthermore, "[t]o establish reduction to practice of a chemical
composition, it is sufficient to prove 'that the inventor actually prepared
the composition and knew it would work."""
The Schendel court agreed with the Board, finding that Schendel "did
not provide direct evidence that he prepared a fusion protein having the
structure required by the count." ' 2 The court stated that "[t]he absence of
corresponding molecular weight or other information for the purported
IL-3/G-CSF fusion protein, or even any data confirming the coding
sequence of the plasmid, leaves unproved the question whether Schendel
ever successfully prepared the fusion protein specified by the count."" 3
104. Id (citing Colbert v. Lofdahl, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1068, 1071 (B.P.A.I. 1991)).
105. Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1402.
106. Id. at 1400.
107. Id. at 1402-04.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1402 (citing Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
110. Id. (citing Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
111. Id. (quoting Mikus v. Wachtel, 542 F.2d 1157, 1159 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
112. Id. at 1402-03.
113. Id. at 1403.
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As for the biological activity data Schendel presented to prove that the
bacterial extracts contained a fusion protein as described in the
interference count, the court noted that "[t]he biological activity data
discussed in these declarations do not show that Schendel prepared an
IL-3/G-CSF fusion protein.'. 4 The court further complained that
Schendel's "record is devoid of any explanation or evidence linking the
biological activity data to the composition or structure of the purported
fusion protein.""' 5 Lastly, the majority observed that Schendel had not
provided the court with any persuasive reasons for why his samples
could not have contained a mixture of IL-3 and G-CSF proteins. Absent
such reasons the court was not going to "second-guess the board's
interpretation of technical data.""' 6
C. Judge Newman 's Dissent: We Are Judges, Not Scientists
In her dissent, Judge Newman noted that in a summary judgment
proceeding, Schendel's only obligation was to establish. a prima facie
case of reduction to practice." 7 Quoting Kahl v. Scoville,"' she observed
that when determining reduction to practice, the truth of the allegations
contained within the appellants' affidavits should be assumed." 9 On this
basis, Judge Newman found that because Schendel had submitted
extensive evidence that was "prima facie probative of conception and
reduction to practice of the subject matter of the count," summary
judgment was inappropriate. 20 In support of this conclusion, Judge
Newman stated that "[t]he scientific sufficiency of [Schendel's] evidence
has not been challenged by persons of skill in this field of science;
indeed, both sides followed similar synthesis and assay procedures, to the
same effect.' 2' She also asserted that both the Board and court majority
were playing an "improper judicial role," given that this was a summary
114. lit
115. Id. at 1404.
116. Id
117. Id at 1406 (Newman, J., dissenting).
118. 609 F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
119. Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1406 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Appellants are only required to
establish a prima facie case; that is, it is assumed that the allegations in appellants' affidavits are
true.") (quoting Kahl, 609 F.2d at 995).
120. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
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judgment decision, in not adopting Schendel's assertion that his
experimental results were sufficient to show reduction to practice.122
After reviewing the extensive experimental evidence supplied by
Schendel in support of his reduction to practice of the fusion protein
described in the count,' Judge Newman reasoned that if all reasonable
factual inferences were drawn in favor of Schendel, 124 then he had made
a prima facie showing of reduction to practice. She further suggested that
the majority had applied the wrong criteria during the summary
interference proceeding, arguing that "[t]he criteria for the grant of
summary judgment, a procedure expressly authorized in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.617, are not isolated from the law governing summary
dispositions."'" In a final comment, she stated that "[tihe issue is the
threshold question of the right to contest priority. When this right is
denied summarily, the law requires that the procedure is fair, and fairly
administered. This in turn requires that the rules of summary judgment
be properly applied."' 26
III. REDUCTION TO PRACTICE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
WHEN IS ENOUGH ENOUGH?
The majority opinion in Schendel had two deficiencies in its analysis
of how reduction to practice should be determined. First, the court was
too deferential to the technical expertise of the APJs. The APJ who
handled the Schendel interference should have been required to develop a
record that specifically stated why Schendels' biological assay data was
insufficient to prove the structure of the claimed fusion protein.'27
Second, the court should have adopted the dissenting opinion's
suggestion that the applicable summary judgment standard in a PTO
interference proceeding should be the same as that used in federal
courts: 28 "evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable
122. Id. at 1407 (Newman, J., dissenting).
123. Id at 1407-09 (Newman, J., dissenting).
124. IM at 1409 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Kahl, 609 F.2d at 995, and Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,255 (1986)).
125. Id (Newman, ., dissenting).
126. Id (Newman, J., dissenting).
127. The patent statutes require that the Federal Circuit review of PTO decisions be based "on the
record before the Patent and Trademark Office." 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1994). Thus, there is a clear
statutory requirement that the PTO maintain adequate records of interference proceedings to
facilitate Federal Circuit review. See Gechter v. Davidson, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030, 1033 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
128. Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1409 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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inferences are to be drawn in his favor." '29 These procedures are
necessary to safeguard the rights of junior parties to have full and fair
hearings of their assertions of invention priority.
The Schendel pleadings reveal the lack of procedurad safeguards in
current PTO interference practice. Not only was the Federal Circuit
unable to review an adequate PTO record regarding Schendel's evidence
of reduction to practice, but imposing a stringent summary judgment
standard precluded Schendel from obtaining an opportunity to prove his
alleged reduction to practice of the invention. Although these arguments
necessarily require some discussion of molecular biology in order to
appreciate why Schendel's submitted evidence did in fact establish at
least a prima facie case of reduction to practice, the sarle principles of
procedural fairness are applicable to all patent applications, regardless of
their technological scope. Without a complete record, meaningful
appellate review of PTO findings of fact and law is impossible.
A. Administrative Patent Judges Should Form a Record That Allows
Appellate Review
In Schendel, both the initial APJ's order to show cause 30 and the
Board's final summary judgment decision' failed to address explicitly
the relevance of important experimental data, and the interpretation of
that data, as submitted by Schendel in support of his prima facie case of
reduction to practice. Schendel, in his sworn declaration'32 and his
response to the PTO's order to show cause,'33 presented critical
biological activity data that directly supported his assertion of reduction
to practice. Schendel stated that not only did he make a bacterial protein
extract that contained the biological activities expected of each
constituent protein comprising his inventive fusion protein, but that
standard biochemical analysis of the protein activity data also
demonstrated that the two measured protein activities had to be contained
upon the same molecule.' It is this latter point that both the initial APJ
and the Board failed to address in their opinions.
129. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
130. Joint App. (Order to Show Cause) at A23-27, Schendel (No. 95-1329).
131. Id. (Final Decision) at AI-19.
132. Id. (Declaration of Paul Schendel) at A35-36.
133. Id. (Explanation Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.607 et seq.) at A106-08; Brief for Appellant at
39-40, Schendel (No. 95-1329); see also Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1408-09 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (Newman, J., dissenting).
134. Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1407-09 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1128
Vol. 72:1109, 1997
Reduction to Practice and Patent Priority
Both of the PTO decisions found fault with Schendel's submitted
experimental data because it purportedly failed to provide proof of the
structure of the protein within the bacterial protein extract.'3 5 The APJ
and the Board relied upon Colbert v. Lofdahl'36 for the proposition that a
biological assay is insufficient to prove the chemical structure of a
protein molecule.'37 However, a careful reading of Colbert shows that the
experimental facts crucial to the Colbert holding are not present in
Schendel, and, therefore, the Board's reliance on Colbert is misplaced.
Colbert involved the use of a biological protein assay to prove that a
particular DNA clone encoding a specific protein molecule had been
isolated by the senior party, Lofdahl, from a large number of other DNA
clones that could be encoding any of the other proteins produced within
the bacterium from which the DNA originated. 3 Lofdahl attempted to
persuade a Board that he had proof of reduction to practice of a
recombinant DNA invention, whereby he claimed that he had isolated a
gene encoding a specific protein. Lofdahl asserted that the identity of the
gene, i.e., its structure, could be proven by experimental evidence that
the cloned DNA molecule encoded a protein having a biological activity
that was consistent with the claimed identity. The Board rejected this
evidence, noting that "until the clone was isolated and its sequence
known, there was no certainty that [the clone] encoded the amino acid
sequence for [the desired protein].' 39
In Colbert, the Board reached the correct result because, in fact, given
the complex nature of the gene isolation experiments being performed,
there could have been other genes present in the starting bacteria that
might also produce proteins having similar biological activity to the
protein encoded by the claimed invention.* Thus, there could be no
certainty that Lofdahl had isolated the gene he claimed to have isolated;
the bioassay merely suggested that he had isolated a gene that might be
the correct one. In contrast, in Schendel the DNA sequences of both of
the parent genes, which were fused together to form the fusion gene
encoding the claimed invention, had been previously determined. 140
Furthermore, Schendel had verified the junctions between the DNA
135. Joint App. (Final Decision) at All (citing Order to Show Cause).
136. 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1068, 1071 (B.P.A.1. 1991).
137. Joint App. (Final Decision) at Al1; iU (Order to Show Cause) at A26.
138. See Colbert, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069-72.
139. Id at 1072.
140. Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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sequences of the parent genes on his fusion gene recombinant plasmid.'4 '
Thus, as the dissent points out, "[i]t is surely more likely than not that the
products were the G-CSF and IL-3 proteins and not some heretofore
unknown mimics."142 Therefore, the reasoning of Colber is inapplicable
to Schendel. In Schendel, there were no other genes present in the
transformed bacteria that could have given rise to the observed
bioactivity except for the fusion gene Schendel had constructed.
The majority in Schendel pointedly suggested that Schendel should
have determined the molecular weight of the fusion protein in order to
prove that the produced fusion protein had an increased protein size as
would be predicted by joining two proteins together to form one large
fusion protein. 4 3 However, as the dissent stated, this type of suggestion
is improper judicial conduct.'" The PTO records clearly showed that
Schendel submitted and argued that his experimental evidence directly
demonstrated the structure of the fusion protein. 45 In fact, an argument
can be made that Schendel performed the more relevant experiment for
proving reduction to practice. Schendel determined not only that a fusion
protein had been created in which two proteins were joined together to
form one protein, but also that the inventive fusion protein functioned
and had the biological activities that were required to fulfill the
invention's purpose. The experimental determination of the molecular
weight of a fusion protein, as requested by the majority judges, does not
address the important issue of whether the invention fimctions for its
intended purpose, nor does such an experiment provide: any definitive
proof of the fusion protein's composition. 14 6
141. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1408 (Newman, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1404. Protein molecular weight is a function of how many amino acid residues are
present in a protein. However, the experimental methods commonly used to determine protein
molecular weight (gel electrophoresis or gel filtration) are at best imprecise. The loss or addition of
several amino acids will not be detectable. Thus, knowledge of a protein's molecular weight, as
determined generally in the art of molecular biology, cannot be equated with the determination of the
structure of a fusion protein.
144. Id at 1408 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("It is not our appellate role to devise experiments that
the inventor did not deem it necessary to conduct, and then to hold that the judges' choice of
experiments is dispositive of the issue.").
145. Id. at 1409 (Newman, J., dissenting).
146. Actual reduction to practice requires that inventors prove their inventions will work as
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In a post-Schendel opinion, Gechter v. Davidson,47 the court held that
Board opinions must meet an "equivalent standard" to that stated in Rule
52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 The Board opinions must
set forth "specific findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate to
form a basis for our review." '149 The court reasoned that "[w]hen the
opinion explaining the decision lacks adequate fact findings, meaningful
review is not possible, frustrating the very purpose of appellate
review."'o5 These statements could have just as easily been made in the
Schendel opinion.
The Schendel majority noted that the judiciary's review function was
not to "second-guess the board's interpretation of technical data.""'
However, proper judicial deference to agency adjudicatory decisions
does not relieve a reviewing court from its obligation to ensure that the
PTO has made the requisite findings of fact and applications of law on
the evidence submitted to them. As noted in the dissenting opinion, the
Board made a clearly erroneous finding when it stated that Schendel had
presented no evidence that the IL-3 and G-CSF proteins were linked.'52
Therefore, under the logic of Gechter, the Schendel court should have
vacated the Board's summary judgment.
B. Interference Summary Judgment Standard Should Not Unfairly
Preclude a Junior Party from a Full Interference Hearing
An interference proceeding turns on the determination of whether the
junior party has provided sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
showing of reduction to practice. To meet this burden, junior party
inventors must build the invention and perform tests to determine that
their inventions are functional for their intended purposes.'53 Under PTO
rules, once an interference is declared, junior parties effectively have
only one chance to submit the evidence necessary to establish their prima
facie case of reduction to practice.5 Additional evidence in support of
147. 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
148. Id. at 1034.
149. Md. at 1035.
150. Id at 1033.
151. Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
152. Id at 1408-09 (Newman, J., dissenting).
153. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
154. 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(b) (1996) ("Additional evidence shall not be presented by the applicant or
considered by the Board unless the applicant shows good cause why any additional evidence was not
initially presented with the evidence filed under § 1.608(b)."); MPEP, supra note 4, § 2317, at
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reduction to practice will be allowed only at the discretion of the
Board,155 upon a showing of "good cause" for why the evidence was not
submitted originally. 56 The Federal Circuit has upheld Board decisions
to prevent introduction of new evidence because: (1) an inventor's patent
counsel "did not fully appreciate the kind of corroboration required to
demonstrate a prima facie case for a complete reduction to practice";'57
and (2) an attorney misrepresented to a client his ability and experience
in prosecuting interference cases. 5
However, as noted by commentator Charles L. Gholz, '59 the PTO rule
governing summary judgment in interference proceedigs specifically
directs the APJ or the Board to "decide whether the evidence submitted
under § 1.608(b) and any additional evidence properly submitted under
paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section shows that the applicant is prima
facie entitled to a judgment relative to the patentee. 1 6' Gholz further
argues that there is a fundamental difference between federal judges and
APJs; the former are generalists, whereas the latter axe required by
statute 16 1 to be specialists in both patent law and science. 62 However, the
fact that APJs are specialist judges does not relieve the PTO from the
duty of explicitly stating what its summary judgment standard is, nor
should it exempt the PTO from having some summary judgment
safeguards analogous to those found in federal courts.
The PTO should embrace the same summary judgment standards and
safeguards in patent interference proceedings as those developed in
federal courts. The federal court doctrine of summary judgment is well
developed and incorporates two safeguards to protect the party against
2300-28 to 2300-30; see also Francis A. Paintin, The Impact of the New 1izterference Rules on
Chemical Patent Practice, 206 PLI/Pat 55, 70 (1985).
155. Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that Board did not abuse
its discretion in deciding that junior party had not shown good cause; therefore, Board properly
declined to consider additional evidence in response to show cause order).
156. 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(b). In the MPEP comment to § 1.617, the PTO expressly states that
"[u]nder the 'good cause' standard, ignorance by a party or counsel of the provisions of the rules or
the substantive requirements of the law will not constitute good cause." MPEP, supra note 3, § 2317,
at 2300-28 to 2300-30.
157. Hahn, 892 F.2d at 1035.
158. Huston v. Ladner, 973 F.2d 1564, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
159. Charles L. Gholz, A Critique of Recent Opinions of the Federal Circuit, 79 J. Pat. &
Trademark Off. Soc'y 271,290 (1997).
160. 37 C.F.RL § 1.617(g) (1996).
161. 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1994) ("[E]xaminers-in-chief shall be persons of competent legal
knowledge and scientific ability .... ").
162. Gholz, supra note 159, at 290.
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whom summary judgment is being asserted from being unfairly
precluded from his or her day in court. First, summary judgments are
reviewed de novo by U.S. Courts of Appeals. 63 Second, under a rule first
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Diebold, Inc.,'
64
judges, in making a summary judgment ruling, must view evidence
submitted to them "in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion." 16
5
The primary danger of summary judgment is that it might prematurely
prevent a party from obtaining a full and fair hearing of his or her case.
When making a summary judgment, the judge is not supposed to weigh
the credibility of the evidence or determine the truth of the contested
matter, but is only supposed to determine whether there is a genuine
dispute of material fact.'" Thus, as noted by the Schendel dissent,
"matters of truth and credibility and judicial determination of scientific
significance contrary to the view of the scientists themselves, are not
matters for summary adjudication."'67 Had Schendel survived summary
judgment, the next stage of the proceeding would have focused on
whether Schendel's evidence proved priority by a preponderance of the
evidence. All of the parties asserting inventorship would then file
preliminary statements and motions 168 and procure witness testimony'69
regarding their claims to priority. The PTO rules governing this process
are extensive and beyond the scope of this Note. However, the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure provides: "Manifestly, the burden in
summary judgment proceedings is not as strict as the burden in
proceedings following summary judgments.' 170
The main purpose for allowing summary judgment is to allow a judge
to dispose of nonmeritorious cases rapidly.' 7' Judicial dispatch is
163. Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure § 13.4, at 604 (2d ed. 1993).
164. 369 U.S. 654 (1962) (per curiam).
165. Id. at 654 ("On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts
contained in [affidavits] must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion."). This principle was firther developed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Adickes v. S.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
166. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-50.
167. Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1409 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman, J., dissenting).
168. MPEP, supra note 3, §§ 2322-2340, at 2300-30 to 2300-40.
169. Id. §§ 2351-2353, at 2300-43 to 2300-44.
170. Id § 2317, at 2300-29 (citing Brewer v. DeMarinis, 558 F.2d 22, 28 (C.C.P.A. 1977), and
Schwab v. Pittman, 451 F.2d 637, 640 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
171. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (stating summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded as integral part of Federal Rules, which are designed to secure just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action); see also Lundeen v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401,
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important to relieve a party from costly and unfair litigation, and, as a
general policy, to allow courts to conserve valuable monetary and
personnel resources for only those cases that have merit.172 One of the
primary arguments in favor of summary judgment in agency adjudication
is to relieve the long delays that are generally associated with
administrative processes." Indeed, some of the PTO rules governing
patent interference practice were rewritten in 1984 to streamline
proceedings so that most disputes would be decided within two years. 74
Thus, while there is a legitimate place for summary judgment within
administrative adjudications, fundamental fairness concerns suggest that
procedural safeguards should be present to guarantee parties the
opportunity to have meritorious claims judged based upon all admissible
evidence.
The standards for summary judgment in federal court are set forth in
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "Summary judgment is
proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, siaow that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."" 75 The U.S. Supreme Court has
further explained that for summary judgment, the "evidence of the
nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.' 17
6
To what extent then do the federal standards governing summary
judgment inform summary judgment during administrative adjudication?
In Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. EPA,177 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed the use of summar judgment in
administrative agencies and concluded that administrative summary
judgment is "linked inextricably" to Rule 56, and that "many agencies
408 (8th Cir. 1966) (explaining that "the purpose of the summary judgment is to avoid.., useless
waste of time and expense to the parties as well as a needless inconvenience to the Court").
172. See generally Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (discussing summary judgment in historical context
of procedural tools that prevent trial of cases containing "factually insufficient claims or defenses...
with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources").
173. See Ernest Gellhom & William F. Robinson, Jr., Summary Judgment in Administrative
Adjudication, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 612, 612 (1971).
174. See Huston v. Ladner, 973 F.2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Paintin, supra
note 154, at 58.
175. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
176. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,255 (1986).
177. 35 F.3d 600 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1148 (1995).
1134
Vol. 72:1109, 1997
Reduction to Practice and Patent Priority
habitually look to Rule 56 case law for guidance in respect to
administrative summary judgments."' 8
PTO interference proceedings present an exception to this general
principle. For these proceedings there has been no clear judicial or
agency affirmation or denial that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
inform the standards to be used during the application of summary
judgment. 79 The PTO regulation regarding summary judgment merely
states:
If in the opinion of the administrative patent judge the evidence
falls to show that the applicant isprimafacie entitled to a judgment
relative to the patentee, the administrative patent judge shall,
concurrently with the notice declaring the interference, enter an
order stating the reasons for the opinion and directing the applicant,
within a time set in the order, to show cause why summary
judgment should not be entered against the applicant.8
The rule further states:
[T]he Board shall decide whether the evidence submitted... shows
that the [junior party] is prima facie entitled to a judgment relative
to the [senior party]. If the [junior party] is not prima facie entitled
to a judgment relative to the [senior party], the Board shall enter a
final decision granting summary judgment against the [junior
party].'18
However, Judge Newman states in her dissenting opinion in Schendel
that "[t]he Board's summary disposition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.617 was
necessarily based on the premise that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the party Curtis is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."'8 Judge Newman also argues, and quotes from Kahl v.
Scoville,"8 3 for the proposition that during PTO summary judgment
proceedings the "[a]ppellants are only required to establish a prima facie
case; that is, it is assumed that the allegation in appellants' affidavits are
178. Id at 607.
179. See Gechter v. Davidson, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that
Board is not bound by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it has never voluntarily bound itself
to them).
180. 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(a) (1996).
181. 37 C.F.R. § 1.617(g) (1996).
182. Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317,322-23 (1986)).
183. 609 F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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true."'' The terminology Judge Newman uses in the opinion clearly
indicates her view that the federal court summary judgment standards
and case law should apply to PTO interference practice. Such a view also
finds support in Gechter v. Davidson, where the Federal Circuit looked
to federal court jurisprudence regarding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 52(a) to support its holding that "like a district court opinion, a
Board opinion must contain sufficient findings and reasoning to permit
meaningful appellate scrutiny."' 5
The stringent PTO summary judgment rule, limiting a junior party's
ability to make additional submissions of evidence to th. PTO to defeat
summary judgment, is in stark contrast to practice in federal courts where
the party against whom a summary judgment motion has been lodged is
allowed the opportunity to, and indeed, in most cases, must submit
further evidence to substantiate his or her claim or defense.'86 Adopting
the federal court summary judgment jurisprudence, particularly the
requirement that the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and that
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his or her favor, would go a
long way towards balancing the junior party's interest fcr a full and fair
hearing regarding patent priority against the PTO's need to settle
interference disputes rapidly.
IV. CONCLUSION
Schendel v. Curtis exposes one of the major flaws inherent in a first-
to-invent priority system: the difficulty of fairly determining the exact
time at which an invention worthy of patent protection has occurred. The
problem is, of course, exacerbated by the highly technical nature of many
of the inventions described in patent applications submitted to the PTO.
While the PTO employs many examiners and APJs of' high technical
ability, there is nonetheless a large gap between actual p:7actitioners in a
technical field and persons merely reading the results. If the United
States is to persist in the first-to-invent patent priority system and the
interference adjudication system of determining priority disputes, then
184. Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1409 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Kahl, 609 -.2d at 995).
185. Gechter v. Davidson, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1997,.
186. Rule 56(e) states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made ... an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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changes should be made to the PTO interference regulations to more
fully protect the interests of the junior party inventors. First, the
Gechter v. Davidson rule, that APJs must set forth opinions with specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate to form a basis of
appellate review, should be stringently enforced when the Federal Circuit
is reviewing interference summary judgments of the PTO. Second, the
interference summary judgment standard should be substantially
equivalent to the summary judgment standard utilized in federal courts.
The adoption of both of these procedural safeguards would help
ensure that PTO interference practice more fully comports with the
policies supporting the first-to-invent priority rule and would ensure that
junior parties to interference proceedings have a fair opportunity to
establish patent priority based upon reduction to practice of their
inventions. The failure to more fully protect the legitimate interests of
junior parties to patent interference disputes only adds support to what
some commentators assert is true about the U.S. patent system: the
United States, in fact, awards patents under a de facto first-to-file priority
rule and the United States has little to lose by changing from a first-to-
invent priority rule to the first-to-file rule. Adopting these standards
would help restore some of the balance to the first-to-invent priority
system and safeguard what is portrayed as its major advantage-fairness
to all inventors.
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